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ABSTRACT 
DIASPORAS AND DOLLARS:  TRANSNATIONAL 
TIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CUBA 
For many Third World countries, remittances are becoming a more important source of 
funds than foreign aid, bank loans, and foreign investment, as families find their own 
transnational solutions to limited homeland economic opportunities. This is true in 
socialist Cuba as well as in poor market economies. The impact of remittances, however, 
is contingent on the social relations and social structures in which the foreign currency 
becomes embedded. What may be good for recipients may be a “mixed bag” for states 
with their own institutional concerns. Although as a Communist regime Cuba appears to 
be a strong state with a weak society, remittance dynamics are transforming and 
undermining as well as bolstering the state. Concomitantly, remittances are strengthening 
society, but within a transnationalized context, and differentially. Conditions conducive 
to remittance-sending and the results of the informal dollarization are described and 
analyzed below, with comparisons made to trends in Central American countries with 
similar “open” economies but different regime types.  
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Diasporas and Dollars: Transnational 
Ties and the Transformation of Cuba 
 
Susan Eckstein1 
 
I.  Introduction 
  
Third World governments have long depended on foreign funding to supplement limited 
domestic private and official sources. Foreign sources include financing from private, 
public, bilateral, and multilateral institutions, as well as direct investment. Governments 
have also depended on foreign exchange from exports or tourism and, more recently, 
from remittances, to finance imports, loan repayments, and local development. At 
different times and in different countries, the mix of foreign sources of capital and 
foreign exchange has varied, depending on global as well as domestic economic and 
political conditions. In the neoliberal post Cold War world order, slimmed down Third 
World governments have had fewer disposable domestic fiscal funds and less access, in 
the main, to multilateral and especially bilateral sources of capital. They have been 
pressed to rely increasingly on market options. With the gap in income opportunities 
widening within and across borders, ordinary people in the less developed world have 
become increasingly creative. Through emigration to countries with better economic 
opportunities, they have become their own capital fundraisers, remitting some of their 
earnings to family left behind. 
 
As of the year 2000, remittances infused more money into Latin America than foreign 
bilateral and multilateral aid, and in some countries more money than direct foreign 
investment and bank loans. Remittances amounted to some $20 billion, with individual 
Latin Americans sending home, on average, an estimated $250 monthly. In six Latin 
American countries, income from remittances represented more than 10 percent of GDP. 
The money has raised recipients’ material and social welfare and provided seed capital 
for small businesses. On a national scale, the cross-border transfers have had multiplier 
effects on the economy.2 
  
It is important to understand contextually the conditions conducive to remittance-sending 
and their effects, distinguishing their impact on individual and institutional levels. Such 
                                                 
1 Boston University, Department of Sociology, Boston, MA 02215. seckstei@bu.edu. The 
author thanks the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and The Mellon-MIT Program on 
NGOs and Forced Migration for financial support of the research on which this study is 
based. My thanks also to Lorena Barberia for help in field work and data acquisition that 
I draw upon in this article, to Manuel Orozco, who graciously shared data with me, and to 
Emily Morris, who provided me with very informed, detailed comments on an earlier 
version of the paper. And thanks also to William LeoGrande, Luciano Martins, Jorge 
Perez-Lopez, and Archibald Ritter for helpful comments, and to Sharon Stanton Russell 
and Cynthia Thompson for comments and editorial assistance. 
 
2 International Herald Tribune July 13, 2001, www.iht.com. 
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distinctions are needed because, first, remittances that may be good for individuals are 
not necessarily unequivocally good for states, as states have their own institutional 
economic and political interests that may differ from the narrow interests of individual 
remittance recipients. Second, while remittances benefit recipients, in the Third World 
individuals vary in access to transnational income-sharing networks. As a consequence, 
remittances are not a substitute for other sources of assistance. Third, remittances may 
generate consequences recipients or the state do not envision or even desire. Effects 
depend on the social context in which remittances become embedded.  
 
Below, this paper illustrates these propositions in Cuba in the post-Soviet era. After a 
brief  discussion of previous studies of remittances and of state/societal dynamics that 
shape cross-border people-to-people monetary flows at the macro level, the paper depicts 
in depth how societal and state dynamics have shaped remittance flows in Cuba since 
1990, with what effects, and why. The theoretical significance of the Cuban case is 
addressed in the conclusion. 
 
Previous studies of remittances at the individual level focus on attributes of immigrants 
who send remittances. Immigrant earnings and time- lag since emigration are two factors 
found to correlate with transnational family transfers: the former is indicative of émigré 
ability to forego income, while time- lag reflects the likely strength of homeland ties. 
Motivation for migration is also found to be of consequence. Refugees generally remit 
less than economic immigrants because they oppose the regime from which they fled.3 
 
Previous studies on the macro level show how remittances help finance imports, improve  
national income, and stimulate economic growth directly and indirectly. 4 While previous 
studies have paid some attention to the role of governments in inducing remittance-
sending, analyses are needed of conditions shaping how, when, and why governments 
induce remittance-sending and the full range of effects of remittance-sending on both 
state and society, and why. This paper addresses the lacunae. 
 
                                                 
3 Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López, “Refugee Remittances: Conceptual Issues 
and the Cuban and Nicaraguan Experiences,” International Migration Review vol. 31 no. 
2 
(Summer 1997): 411-37, and  Douglas Massey et al., Worlds in Motion: Understanding  
International Migration at the End of the Millennium (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),  
and the references therein. 
 
4 See, e.g., Sharon Stanton Russell and Michael Teitelbaum, International Migration and  
International Trade (Washington D.C.: World Bank Discussion Paper 160, 1992); Jorge  
Durand, Emilio Parrado, and Douglas Massey, “Migradollars and Development: A  
Reconsideration of the Mexican Case,” International Migration Review vol. 30 no. 2 
(Summer 1996): 423- 
44;  and Massey et al., Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the  
End of the Millennium (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).   
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From the standpoint of the role of the state, the Cuban case is particularly instructive. 
During the Cold War, Communist regimes were portrayed as strong states with weak 
societies,5 even when state cohesion was recognizably constrained by partially disparate 
interests of different public bureaucracies.6  During the Soviet era in Cuba, when state 
ownership of the means of production was perhaps the most extreme in the world, and 
after the Cold War with the state still committed to socialism, Cuba should, in principle, 
represent a “most likely case” of a state able to regulate remittance inflows and the uses 
to which they are put.  
 
The domino collapse of Soviet bloc Communism and then the Soviet Union’s dissolution 
showed such regimes to be weaker and society stronger than Cold War paradigms 
suggested. Comparative analyses, benefiting from hindsight, show that a shift in the 
balance of power between state and society occurred in the 1980s, when elites competed 
for fewer resources as productivity faltered, and society, homogenized by ega litarian 
wage policies, became more unified, autonomous, resourceful, and empowered.7 
 
The strength of a state, however, must be assessed in an international, not merely 
domestic context. At the global level, from the close of World War II until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Cold War rivalries shaped options for poor countries such as Cuba. 
Since  the Cold War’s end politics of the single remaining hegemon, the U.S., and to a 
lesser extent the politics of other industrial countries, individually and collectively, have 
shaped Third World country options. 
 
Similarly, global market dynamics influence Third World options. In Cuba this influence 
occurred already during the Cold War.8 After the Cold War, Cuba, along with other 
                                                 
5 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton University Press,  
1988). 
 
6 William Leogrande, “A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military Relations in 
Communist Systems: The Case of Cuba,” in Comparative Communist Civil-Military 
Relations, Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp.  
201-18. 
 
7 Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and  
the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Laszlo Bruszt and  
David Stark, in “Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of 
Confrontation to the Politics of Competition,” Journal of International Affairs vol. 45 no. 
1 (Summer 1991): 201-45, however, take issue with this interpretation. They argue that 
East European Communist countries could better be described as weak states/weak 
societies. This paper, meanwhile, argues that society, in its informal if not formal 
expression, has been quite vibrant and influential in certain institutional arenas in Cuba 
since the 1990s, within a transnational context. 
 
8 Susan Eckstein, “Capitalist Constraints on Cuban Socialist Development,” Comparative  
Politics (April 1980): 253-74. 
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remaining regimes dominated by Communist parties, have had to reintegrate themselves 
into the global market economy for trade and financing, despite any remaining efforts 
domestically to regulate market features. 
 
Subaltern studies suggest that formally weak domestic groups may further constrain 
seemingly strong states through informal, covert, and illegal activity. 9 Even in the 
absence of formal channels of organization and interest articulation, people can evade 
official rules and regulations through black market and sideline activity, hoarding, tax 
evasion, and the like, which affect what states can accomplish. In economies with non-
convertible currency, dollar activity may involve covert illegal transactions that in effect, 
if not intent, undermine official plans, priorities, and power.  
 
The state itself must be “unpacked” to understand fully what it does, why, and with what 
societal effects. Official institutions designed to address political or administrative needs 
may have divergent priorities from those dealing with economic exigencies, and policies 
supporting one state concern may undermine anothe r. Regimes often face trade-off’s 
between consumption and investment, and between long and short-term, political and 
technical/economic concerns. Accordingly, official remittance- linked policies may be 
based on institutional political concerns and not merely economic rationality, with the 
two preoccupations possibly conflicting. Policies designed to bring remittance dollars to 
the central government’s treasury, thereby addressing official fiscal and other economic 
exigencies, may, for example, have the unintended effect of eroding the state’s capacity 
to maintain law and order, if people seek dollars illicitly or for purposes not legally 
permitted. 
 
While state and society may be analytically separable, and each internally “unpacked,” in 
practice they may be mutually interactive and transformative. Joel Migdal persuasively 
argues how and why this may be so.10 The analysis below, however, shows that the social 
field in which state and society engage may go beyond the nation-state as conventionally 
conceived.  
 
The following analysis of Cuban remittance dynamics draws on United Nations and other 
multilateral data, as well as on official U.S. and Cuban sources. Where appropriate, 
trends in Cuba are compared with trends in the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, two 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9 See, for example, James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant  
Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) and Domination and the Arts of  
Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); with respect to Cuba, see  
Eckstein, Back from the Future: Cuba under Castro (Princeton: Princeton University  
Press, 1994) and Damian Fernandez, Cuba and the Politics of Passion (Austin:  
University of Texas Press, 2000).  
 
10 Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and  
Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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countries with similar externally driven economies, of roughly comparable size but 
subject to different economic and political constraints.11 The comparisons help highlight 
which remittance dynamics are distinctive to a socialist economy and which are shared 
with other small, weak Third World economies (of which there are many), and why. In 
addition, the analysis draws on news sources and secondary materials. Supplementary 
information comes from semi-structured interviews with Cuban-Americans, both leaders 
of different institutions and rank-and-file residents in the two historically most important 
U.S. Cuban-American settlements, in Greater Miami/Dade County (Florida) and Greater 
Union City/Hudson County (New Jersey), and with Cuban authorities, scholars, and 
ordinary people in Havana.12       
 
II. Crisis Caused by the Shift from “Socialist Solidarity” to Socialist Solitary   
 
The Soviet bloc at the eve of its collapse accounted for 85 percent of Cuba’s trade. Four 
years later former bloc members accounted for a mere 20 percent. With trade in 1989 
accounting for about half the gross national product, the decline in bloc exports and 
imports sent the island economy into a tailspin. The economy contracted over 30 percent 
by 1993.13  
 
A hard currency debt, dating back to the 1970s, also weighed on Cuba’s capacity to 
adjust to the new world order. In 1989, Cuba had the second highest ratio of hard 
currency debt to hard currency exports in the region. 14 Short of foreign exchange, the 
government suspended servicing its Western debt in 1986 losing access to new credit 
lines as a result. Yet, owing to the accumulation of interest and principal arrears, the debt 
continued to mount. In the 1990s it increased over 60 percent.15 Cuba owed additional 
                                                 
11 Although Mexico receives more remittances than any other Latin American country, 
the scale of its economy makes for different remittance dynamics there than in small 
“open” economies.  
 
12 For a discussion of the range of people interviewed and the range of interview topics, 
see Eckstein and Lorena Barberia, “Grounding Immigrant Generations in History: 
Cuban-Americans and Their Transnational Ties,” International Migration Review vol. 36 
no. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 799-837. Since this paper focuses on macro- level remittance 
dynamics, it draws only selectively on the Miami/Union City survey.  
 
13 Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, Comisión  
Económica para America Latina y el Caribe) of the United Nations, La Economía  
Cubana (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económico, 2000). 
 
14 Eckstein, Back from the Future, p. 222.   
 
15 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Cuba Country Report (CCR) November 2001, p. 5  
and Cuba Country Profile 1998-1999, p. 36; Eckstein, “The Limits of Socialism in a  
Capitalist World Economy: Cuba Since the Collapse of the Soviet Bloc, in Toward a New  
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money to Russia, which took over responsibility for the island’s 15 billion ruble debt to 
the former superpower. As of 2002, Moscow and Havana had yet to agree on the 
convertible currency value of this debt.16  
 
The external constraints notwithstanding, by 2000 the economy rebounded somewhat 
(but unevenly) from its 1993 nadir.17 However, Cuba received little foreign capital to 
help out. Comparisons with the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, summarized in 
Table 1, highlight this. A first reason for difference was that Cuba received little aid. The 
Dominican Republic and El Salvador received over three times as much net official aid, 4 
½ to 6 times as much on a per capita basis, and they received, proportionally, 
substant ially more multilateral aid. Second, Cuba attracted about one-seventh as much 
direct foreign investment as the Dominican Republic, and somewhat less than El 
Salvador. Meanwhile, Cuba’s exports remained weak, less than one-third their 1990 
level. Dominican export earnings, about half Cuba’s in 1990, were over three times 
Cuba’s at the turn of the century. Cuba’s export earnings from sugar plunged to their 
lowest level in thirty years ($450 million), owing partly to a dramatic drop-off in output. 
Sugar had accounted for about three-fourths of export earnings for most of the twentieth 
century. Earnings from expanded nickel production partially offset the decline in sugar 
revenue, but not enough for trade to serve as a principal engine of growth.  
  
The government more successfully developed tourism. Tourism became the most vibrant 
economic sector and principal source of foreign exchange.18 While the island’s gross 
tourist earnings remain behind those of the Dominican Republic, they came to far exceed 
those of El Salvador.   
 
Cuba’s economic marginalization results partly from the “weight of history,” from 
problems rooted in the statist political economy inherited from the Soviet era. It also 
results from global politics, specifically from Washington’s tightening of the embargo, at 
a time when the U.S. opened opportunities for other Latin American countries, such as El 
Salvador and the Dominican Republic, e.g., through the Caribbean Basin Initiative. In 
turn, world market forces, in particular the decline in world sugar prices, and Cuba’s 
complete dependence for the first time on the open market for trade in the commodity, 
along with the decline in production, contributed to the island’s trade marginalization. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cuba? Legacies of a Revolution, Miguel Angel Centeno and Mauricio Font, eds. 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1997), p. 136. 
  
16 Cuba Business January-February 2001, p. 4. 
 
17 See ECLAC and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Market, Socialist, and Mixed Economies  
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
 
18 Throughout the 1990s the dollar served as the tourist currency. In 2002 the government 
encouraged European tourists to use the Euro to reduce the importance of the dollar, 
mainly for symbolic reasons, the dollar being “enemy currency.” 
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TABLE 1 
Official Hard Currency Sources : Aid, Investment, Exports, and Tourism in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
and El Salvador in Select Years  
                                                                 Cuba             Dominican Republic         El Salvador 
(1) AID    
    (a) multilateral aid (millions of dollars)  
             1999                                                    8.7                       126.4                            68.3 
    (b) net official development assistance or  
          official aid    
          (1) millions of dollars 
             1994                                                  47                             60                            305 
             1999                                                  58                           195                            183 
          (2) aid per capita (dollars) 
             1994                                                    4                               8                              55 
             1999                                                    5                             23                              30  
 
(2) TOURISM  
    (a) in-bound tourists (thousands) 
            1990                                                  327                       1,305                            194 
            1995                                               1,100                       1,552                              -- 
            1999                                               1,561                       2,649                            658  
            2000                                               1,952                            --                                --     
     (b) tourist receipts (millions $) 
            1990                                                  243                          900                              18 
            1999                                               1,714                       2,524                            211 
 
(3) DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(millions of dollars) 
                                                                             
            1990                                                   54.0a                        133                               2 
            1999                                                 178.2                      1,338                           231 
            2000                                                 399.9                           --                               -- 
 
(4) EXPORTS  
            1980                                                    --                            962                            967 
            1985                                                    --                            739                            695 
            1990                                      5,100                         2,170                            582 
            1995                                              1,507                            765                            998 
            2000                                              1,630                         5.200                         1,164 
 
_____________________________ 
 
a: 1993 
 
Sources: World Bank (WB), World Development Indicators 2001 (Washington: WB, 2001), pp. 210, 
               340, 348, 356; Euromonitor, World Economic Factbook 1989/1999 (London: Euromonitor, 1998), 
               p. 143; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Cuba Country Report May 2001, p. 20 and August 
               2001, pp. 28, 30; WB, World Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
               1997), pp. 218, 242; EIU, Cuba Country Profile 1997-1998, p. 36 and 1998-1999, p.  35; WB, 
               World Tables (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 77. 
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III. Remittances: Induced by Society and the State  
 
Because Cuba was unable to attract sufficient conventional sources of hard currency for 
full recovery, remittance revenues seemed an attractive alternative. Indeed, they were 
Cuba’s fastest growing hard currency source in the 1990s. Latin American offices of the 
United Nations (ECLAC) claim that cross-border people-to-people money transfers 
surged from $50 million in 1990 to over $700 million at the decade’s end (see Table 
2[a]).19 Remittances brought in more dollars than any single island export, with the 
possible exception of nickel in some years, and about twice as much money as the 
government attracted in foreign investment.  
 
The state and ordinary Cubans both had reasons for courting remittances.  Though these 
two groups are analytically separable, concretely, their efforts were intermeshed, 
sometimes mutually reinforcing. However, each sought to maximize dollars captured for 
themselves.20 
 
A. Society-Driven Initiatives  
 
Islanders faced hunger and malnourishment when the economy contracted following the 
fall-off of Soviet aid and trade.21 Average caloric and protein intake dropped some 30 
percent between 1989 and 1993.22 
                                                 
 
19 Remittances are difficult to estimate and politically charged. With minimal official 
information, different sources vary in their remittance calculations. This paper uses 
United Nations ECLAC estimates. ECLAC is a respected international institution, and its 
remittance figures are widely cited. Its estimates are based on inferences from “net 
current transfers” in official balance of payments figures. The figures may include 
informal tourism earnings, e.g., tips, room rentals, and prostitution. Indicative of the 
range of estimates, the well respected Cuban economist, Pedro Monreal (in “La remesas 
familiares en la economia cubana,” Encuentro 14 [Fall 1999]: 50), believed remittances 
in the latter 1990s to total $500 million. Remittances, it should be noted, may also be in-
kind, e.g. medicines, consumer goods, and material inputs for businesses.  
 
20 Individual state institutions, in turn, had independent incentives for attracting dollars. 
The central government requested agencies to raise hard currency to cover their own hard 
currency expenses. Institutional revenue-generating benefited individual members 
indirectly, if not directly, e.g., in sponsoring an internationally attended conference, at 
which employees might cultivate foreign contacts that could come to be personally 
useful, they might be treated to dollar meals, and they might gain access to computers for 
personal as well as institutional use.   
 
21 A new vitamin deficiency, for example, caused an epidemic of optic neuritis, in which 
tens of thousands of islanders lost their eyesight. Through a mass distribution of vitamin 
tablets, the government ended the epidemic.  
 
 13 
 
TABLE 2 
                           
Family Remittances from the U.S. to Cuba, the Dominican  
Republic, and El Salvador 
 
 
      
                                                         Cuba             Dominican Republic          El Salvador 
 
(a) millions of dollars remitted, in 
 
                 1980                                   --                              183                               11         
                 1985                                   --                              242                             126 
                 1990                                  50                              315                             322  
                 1995                                537                              794                          1,061    
                 1999                                800                            1,519                         1,374  
2000                                750                            1,689                         1,750  
 
(b) average annual amount remitted (in dollars) per Cuban,  
      Dominican, and Salvadoran foreign-born living in the U.S. in: 
 
                  1980                                 --                               1,083                            116           
                  1990                                67                                  882                            681 
                  1999                              848                               2,237                         1,805      
 
(c) average annual amount remitted (in dollars) per home   
country resident, in:  
  
                  1990                                 5                                    45                              64 
                  1995                               48a                                    99                            177 
                  1999                               73                                   211                            291  
 
(d) annual amount of total remittances as a % of GDP 
                                                                
                  1990                                  .5b                                   5.3                               6.0 
                  1999                                4.5                                  15.2                             16.9  
_____________________________ 
 
a:  based on mid-1995 population 
b: 1991 
 
sources: Central Banks for Dominican Republic and El Salvador (as compiled by Manuel Orozco, personal 
communication, and analyzed in his “Globalization and Migration: The Impact of Family 
Remittances to Latin America,” Latin American Politics and Society (Summer 2001); on Cuba, 
Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean  (ECLAC)/United Nations, La 
Economia Cubana (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Economico, 2000), p. 220, Cuadro A-30; 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1992, p. 42 and 2000, p. 48;  World 
Bank (WB), World Development Indicators 2001, pp. 12, 44, 362; WB, World Tables 1995, p. 
249; WB, World Development Report 1997, pp. 220, 248; United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), State of  the World Population 1990  (New York: UNFPA, 1990), p. 35; Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Cuba Country Report  February 2001, p. 22. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Eckstein, Back from the Future, p. 222. 
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When the food supply dropped, the Cuban government tried to “equalize sacrifice,” to 
ensure everyone a minimum affordable diet through rationing, and to concentrate scarce 
resources on subsistence by eliminating non-essentials from the economy. This approach 
differed markedly from that of neoliberal-bent governments elsewhere in the region. The 
other governments drove consumer costs up by removing price subsidies. The Cuban 
ration book came to cover, however, no more than half of monthly family needs. Under 
the circumstances, Cubans turned to a black market the scarcities fueled, for 
supplementary food and other items they might want and afford. The value of black 
market trade came to exceed official retail sales.23 But prices in the emergent illegal 
economy became unaffordable with people’s official paychecks. A chicken or a pound of 
cheese, for example, came to cost one-fourth to one-third of the average monthly peso 
salary.  
 
Against this background , government wage policy, dating back to the era of Soviet 
subsidies, caused havoc to the new economy. Workers had received a so-called social 
wage that included, along with a subsidized diet, cradle-to-grave social benefits, such as 
free education and health care, on a scale unknown in most countries in the region, as 
well as inexpensive housing. Average take-home pay through the 1980s, of somewhat 
under 200 pesos a month, made no one rich, but it was adequate, given the state’s 
generous welfare policies. Yet, once islanders needed black market purchases for sheer 
survival, peso earnings no longer sufficed.  
 
Goods unaffordable in pesos were, however, affordable to those able to get a modest 
amount of dollars. Although dollar possession had been illegal, in the black market the 
value of the dollar soared. In 1993 the illegal peso/dollar exchange rate rose to 130: 1, 
while officially the two currencies remained on par. The de facto peso devaluation led 
Cubans to seek assistance from family abroad, defying three decades of normative 
political pressure to cut ties with émigrés who had rejected the revolution.    
 
Although Cuba differed from other Latin American countries in its political economy, 
Cubans, in the main, sought remittances for the same purposes as other Third World 
peoples.24 An estimated 96 percent of Cuban remittances are used to finance family 
consumption. 25  
 
But families in the diaspora wound up financing a Western consumer lifestyle in Cuba 
that the revolution until then had scorned,26 as well as basic subsistence. Some families 
                                                 
 
23 Personal interview with an economist in Cuba, June 1993.   
 
24 Massey et al.; EIU, Latin American Country Briefing October 23, 2001. 
 
25 The Economist October 23, 2001, p. 23. 
 
26 Eckstein, “Family Based Social Capital in the Globalized Economy” (in process). 
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also financed home improvements and small business ventures, in defiance of both U.S. 
and Cuban laws. Although the island government guaranteed that no one paid more than  
10 percent of earnings on housing (and most spent less), by the 1990’s the housing stock 
was in disrepair.  
 
While Washington’s embargo prohibited Cuban-Americans from investing in Cuba and 
restricted the amount of money they could legally send, Havana restricted private 
business activity, whether or not it was based on remittances, except under highly 
circumscribed conditions. Businesses had to be owner-operated, to employ only family 
members, and to pay high (and regressive) taxes,27 in hard currency. As a result of the 
combined constraints, the self-employed, whether or not drawing on remittances, 
reportedly earned on average a mere $34 monthly at the turn of the century. 28 This level 
of income may appear a slim return on so-called migra-dollar investment or base for 
capital accumulation on any scale. Yet, it has proven essential for both macro economic 
growth and for the reduction of Cubans’ dependence on the good-will of family abroad. 
In fact, when converted at the turn-of-the-century unofficial exchange rate, described in 
more detail below, such average earnings equaled 650 pesos, about two and one-half 
times the then average monthly income of a state employee.  
 
Cubans received remittances in ways that by-passed official regulations on both sides of 
the Florida Straits. Some 60 to 75 percent of remittance dollars are believed to come to 
Cuba covertly. 29 Paradoxically, Cubans rely more on informal remittance channels than 
Latin Americans in less regulated economies. Why? For Cuban-American émigrés the 
informal channels are both cheaper and more user-friendly. Funds given by visiting 
overseas family involve no service charges, and to send money from the U.S. Cuban-
Americans can use new informal neighborhood-based middlemen who not only are trust-
worthy but also underprice formal wire transfer services and require no legal 
documentation. On frequent trips to the island middlemen carry goods and money. So-
called mulas, a name taken from the drug trade,30 make no attempt to enforce 
Washington’s embargo. On a smaller scale, Cuban-Americans also send money to island 
kin through “mini-banks” that circumvent both U.S. and Cuban monetary regulations. 
Through the “banks” émigrés deposit money that their Cuban relatives can withdraw 
almost immediately.                                                                                                         
                                                 
 
27 Licensing fees are a regressive tax within the self-employed sector, in that all persons 
are charged the same flat fee, irrespective of earnings. But in diminishing the income gap 
between those privately and publicly employed, the fees serve as a progressive tax. 
 
28 EIU, CCR May 2001, p. 18.  
 
29 Estimates by employees in wire service companies interviewed in the U.S. and Cuba, 
and personal discussion with Manuel Orozco.   
 
30 Such informal couriers take on other names in other countries, such as viajeros in El 
Salvador. 
 16 
U.S. regulations have the unintended effect of encouraging most Cuban-Americans to 
prefer such informal transfer services. First, Washington imposes a cap of $300 quarterly, 
at a time when Latin American immigrants remitted, as noted, an average of $250 per 
month. The U.S. restricts no other Latin American immigrants from sending remittances. 
The constraints on Cuban émigrés were designed to squeeze the regime economically, 
along with aspects of the embargo restricting trade, bank lending, and foreign investment. 
Macro data show that Cuban-Americans, on average, complied with the embargo-related 
restrictions in years when permitting dollar sending (see Table 2[b]), an average that 
includes non-senders as well as senders. Yet, the Miami/Union City interviews conducted 
for this study suggest that if Cuban-Americans want to send more than $300 in a three-
month period, they do so, but informally. Second, U.S. regulations have the effect of 
inducing Cuban-Americans to send money informally because the émigrés dislike the 
documentation process required for sending money through formal channels. Owing to 
the embargo, Washington demands affidavits. This causes uneasiness with Cubans wary 
of government, on both sides of the Florida Straits.  
 
In general, the remittance economy reflects a society that is transnationally grounded, 
able, willing, and wanting to operate according to its own networks and norms, in 
defiance both of U.S. and Cuban official regulations that interfere. Islanders’ reliance on 
dollars from abroad, the way they acquire the money, and the uses they make of the funds 
all reveal a stronger society and weaker state than theories of state socialism suggest and 
than a socialist state desirous of regulating economic activity would choose.  
 
B. State-Driven Initiatives  
 
In desperate need of hard currency, the Cuban government introduced measures not only 
to induce remittance-sending but to channel the money to its treasury. Initiated in 
response to islanders’ informal and illegal outreach to family abroad, the measures 
stimulated additional cross-border dollar-sending: an example of interaction between 
state and society.  
 
Authorities, it should be noted, encouraged remittances with institutional and moral 
ambivalence. The leadership understood that people-to-people transnational dollar flows 
are difficult to regulate and embedded in social networks and norms that defy precepts of 
the revolution. The Communist Party Central Committee, a top political organ of the 
regime, for example, worried that dollars were ideologically contaminating, encouraging 
individualism and materialism.31 Yet, the Party, the ideological apparatus that 
theoretically guides other state organs, faced a situation in which such moral principles 
became a luxury no longer affordable. As the government sought to gain a hold over the 
informal cross-border dollarization of the economy, perhaps its most important initiative 
                                                 
 
31 See William LeoGrande and Julie Thomas, “Cuba’s Quest for Economic 
Independence,”  
Journal of Latin American Studies vol. 34 part 2 (May 2002): 325-64.  
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was to legalize dollar possession in 1993.  Informal dollarization had become so 
pervasive that repressing it was nearly impossible, practically or politically. In making 
legal what had been occurring illegally the government could, in theory, regulate the 
activity better. And without fear of dollar confiscation and arrest Cuban-Americans 
would be more likely to send money (or give it on visits), and islanders would want more 
of the foreign currency.  
 
Meanwhile, authorities developed a strategy that simultaneously addressed both 
islanders’ consumer yearnings and state institutional interests in appropriating dollars that 
came to circulate in the economy. In the process, the former anti-materialist regime 
became a chief agent as well as beneficiary of consumerism. Officials extended to all 
Cubans access to state-linked dollar stores previously reserved for diplomats and other 
foreigners, and they expanded the range of dollar stores and their stock. The consumer 
strategy became so important that, as of 1997, two-thirds of the state’s total hard currency 
income came from sales at official retail stores, compared to only 11 percent from 
exports and 22 percent from tourism. 32 Some 60 percent of sales transactions are said to 
have shifted to dollars.33 Dollar stores offered items unavailable through official 
channels, or not in sufficient quantity, includ ing some removed from retail outlets in the 
early 1990s by authorities when concentrating resources on subsistence. In wire service 
facilities located deep within dollar stores, recipients of formal dollar transfers were 
tempted to spend their money immediately. The very name of the dollar outlets, Hard 
Currency Recuperation Stores, made apparent the state’s strategy for appropriating 
consumer dollars.  
 
By selling items at dollar stores at a considerable mark-up (and raising prices 
periodically, as in 2001), the government generated profit while collecting hard currency 
in people’s hands, the latter essential for continuing its control over the economy. 
Authorities justified what they claimed to be an ideal mark-up--140 percent--on grounds 
of equity:34 a hidden tax on dollar holder spending to support programs benefiting those 
without dollar access. 
 
The government also set up exchange booths called CADECAs (bursars of change) that 
honored the informal “street level” dollar- for-pesos exchange rate. It hoped thereby to 
soak up dollars not spent at dollar stores. Following legalization of dollar possession, a 
combination of policies helped bring the black market exchange rate down from 130 to 
the dollar in 1993 to around 21 pesos to the dollar in 2000, although the informal 
peso/dollar exchange rate rose to 26 or 27:1 in the fall of 2001.35  The “street rate” gave 
                                                 
32 Monreal, p. 51. 
 
33 Lila Rosenblum, A Time for Change: Rethinking U.S.-Cuba Policy (Washington, D.C.:  
Washington Office on Latin America, 2002). 
 
34 This means an item that cost $100 to produce (or import), with a 140 percent tax, 
would sell for $240.  
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dollar-holders more pesos, at the state’s expense, than conversion at the official 1:1 
exchange rate. But continued insistence on the official exchange rate would have offered 
no inducement to Cubans to discontinue exchanging the foreign currency illegally and 
informally. Accordingly, the exchange rates CADECAs offered reflect yet another state 
accommodation to society.      
 
In a further effort to absorb dollars from consumer sales, the government in 1994 opened 
Farmer Markets. The markets were designed to stimulate food production and alleviate 
the subsistence crisis, thereby reining in the black market that thrived on scarcities. At the 
markets farmers could sell any surplus they produced beyond their commitments to the 
state, at prices consumers were willing to pay. The government required sales in pesos to 
prevent the new markets from keeping dollars circulating informally in the economy. 
With exchange booths located in markets, prospective buyers could easily trade their 
dollars for pesos before making purchases. Regulations notwithstanding, dollar-holding 
islanders did not always comply, leaving dollars circulating among the populace. 
 
The government also modified its savings and fiscal policies to capture circulating 
dollars. The government instituted interest-bearing dollar bank accounts, to stimulate 
savings. It also introduced personal taxes on the self-employed, in hard currency as well 
as in pesos. Yet, authorities did not tax remittances directly, so as not to discourage cross-
border money-sending.  Since most money is remitted outside official channels, taxing 
the family transfers directly would have been nearly impossible.  
 
The government itself even entered the remittance business. Because of the embargo, it 
could not set up direct wire or bank services in the United States. Beginning in 1999, 
though, the government established partnerships with such internationally known money 
transfer businesses as Western Union, and then with the Canadian firm TransCard 
(affiliated with MoneyGram in the U.S.). With negligible formal wire service 
competition, the agencies charged remittance senders higher fees for transfers to Cuba 
than to Mexico, Central America, and elsewhere in the Caribbean. 36 The higher rates 
enabled the Cuban state to profit from formal transfers directly, at a time when the Inter-
American Development Bank and other Latin American governments promoted lowering 
transaction costs so that recipients received more of the money immigrants allotted for 
remittances, and intermediaries less. If most remittances were sent through formal 
channels, the Cuban government could directly profit from transfers not only through 
service charges but also through controls on exchange rates.  
 
For hard currency remittances to be forthcoming, overseas Cubans had to be convinced 
not merely to forego earnings but to send money to a regime that, in many instances, they 
                                                                                                                                                 
35 The Economist (October 23, 1999: 37) notes that the government keeps the exchange 
rate low because price subsidies inflate peso incomes, increasing the demand for dollars. 
 
36 Manuel Orozco, “Money, Markets and Costs” (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American  
Development Bank/International Monetary Fund,  2002),  
http://www.thedialogue.org/publications.html. 
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politically despised. Aware of the hostile attitudes, the government in the mid-1990s  
modified its public stance toward the diaspora, facilitated transnational bonding, and 
more openly supported economically motivated migration. The émigrés whom Castro 
previously had pejoratively portrayed as gusanos, worms, to be spurned by good 
revolutionaries, were redefined as the “Cuban community abroad.” To foster ties, the 
government opened a special office within the Ministry of Foreign Relations that focused 
on the diaspora, and authorized the Ministry to sponsor conferences on the Nation and 
Migration. These conferences addressed ways to normalize relations between émigrés, 
their island families, and authorities. In promoting emigrants’ homeland identification, 
Cuba followed a growing trend among Third World governments, including those of the 
Dominican Republic and El Salvador, to reclaim their emigrant populations.37 Politically, 
the Cuban government’s shift in attitude, however, was more dramatic.  
 
At the same time, the Cuban government reduced restrictions on émigré visits. It 
introduced multiple entry visas, and for the first time it allowed Cuban-Americans to stay 
with island relatives and remain for longer than in the past. Except for a period in the late 
1970s, authorities formerly had allowed few Cubans from the diaspora to visit. Cuban-
Americans  took advantage of the easing of restrictions.38 The number of Cuban-
American visitors rose from an estimated 7,000 in 1990 to some 100,000 in 2000.39 
When visiting, Cuban-Americans do not go empty handed. They bring money, as well as 
medications and other gifts. Moreover, the informal bonding makes visiting family 
members more likely to send dollars upon return to their adopted homeland. Although 
there thus was an economic logic to the government’s new visitation permissiveness, the 
intermingling was politically risky. Officials faced the possibility of “another Mariel,” 
referring to the 1980 mass exodus that followed the previous large-scale travel opening. 
The deep economic recession led the government to take the political risk.  
 
The government also became more supportive of migration, and in so doing broadened 
the potential overseas remittance-sending base. For example, it negotiated a new 
immigration accord with Washington in 1994. At Cuba’s insistence, the U.S. agreed to 
accept a minimum of 20,000 immigrants annually (at a time when Washington no longer 
honored country quotas). Here, Castro’s immediate concern was political. The accord 
came on the heels of the regime’s largest public protest, in Havana, stirred by the 
subsistence crisis caused by the deep economic recession.  The government sought to 
                                                 
 
37 See Nina Glick-Schiller, “Transmigrants and Nation-States: Something Old and  
Something New in the U.S. Immigrant Experience,” in The Handbook of International  
Migration: The American Experience, Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh  
DeWind, eds. (N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), pp. 94-119.  
 
38 For several reasons, Cuban-American interest in travel to Cuba picked up in the 1990s. 
See Eckstein and Barberia for details.     
 
39 See ibid., Figure 2, p. 814, and the references therein. See also Cuba Business May 
2001, p. 6.   
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defuse tensions by opening up the option to leave, thereby encouraging “exit” over 
“voice,” to borrow Albert Hirschman’s terminology. 40  To Washington’s dismay, Castro 
brought the tumult to bay by allowing islanders to seek refuge in the U.S., in make-shift 
rafts, without entry permission.  Some 33,000 balseros (rafters) took advantage of the 
opportunity before the two countries signed the new accord.  In the early 1990s 
Washington had only granted entry permits to 50 to 75 percent of a 20,000 yearly cap in 
place since the mid-1980s, with the hopes of inciting pressure for regime change in Cuba. 
The new accord bound both countries to respect an orderly processing of the agreed-upon 
minimum number of annual immigrants. And with Cubans as of the 1990s increasingly 
“wanting out” for economic reasons, as every day living became problematic, the 
government for the first time sent abroad on a large scale the archetypal remittance-
sender. 
 
In addition, the government for the first time allowed islanders to work abroad on a 
temporary basis, for up to 11 months, without losing island benefits and rights. Cubans 
with internationally marketable skills could take advantage of the window of opportunity 
to earn hard currency for family left behind, without permanently breaking with their 
homeland.41  
 
The embargo, however, set limits on the Cuban government’s ability to encourage the 
diaspora to send dollars to family left behind in their homeland.  Not only did 
Washington restrict the amount of money émigrés could remit, it also prevented Cuban 
authorities from promoting in the U.S. the range of remittance-sending strategies used by 
other governments in the region. 42  
                                                 
 
40 Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  
1970).   
 
41 The government also sought official overseas temporary hard currency work contracts, 
such as for doctors and teachers, capitalizing on the revolution’s massive training of 
social service professionals. In such instances the state, but laborers only minimally, 
earned foreign exchange. The government initially sought such contracts in the late 
1970s, when first faced with a Western debt (see Eckstein, Back from the Future, chap. 
7). It promoted such state labor contracts at the same time that it obstructed the 
independent emigration of professionals. Official overseas skilled labor contracts brought 
hard currency to the state coffer, while the emigration of professionals deprived the 
government of a return to its human capital investment.   
 
42 B. Lindsay Lowell and Rodolfo de la Garza, The Developmental Role of Remittances in  
U.S. Latino Communities and in Latin American Countries (Washington, D.C.: Inter- 
American Dialogue and Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, 2000),  
http:/www.thedialogue.org/publications.html.  
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IV. Impact of Remittances 
       
Remittances, spurred initially by islanders’ survival needs, transformed both state and 
society, and not only in ways they intended or wanted. Not all members of society 
benefited in a uniform manner, and remittances eroded de facto state command over the 
economy, law enforcement, and the moral order, while simultaneously providing the 
government with much needed hard currency revenue. The impact of remittances was 
shaped by the political economy in which the informal transnational income became 
embedded.  
 
A. Societal Impact  
 
Viewed comparatively, remittance-coveting islanders are at a disadvantage. First, 
Cubans, on average, were less likely than Salvadorans to have kin abroad to whom to 
turn, though about as likely as Dominicans (see Table 3[c]).43 Second, émigrés from 
Cuba on average remitted substantially less money than émigrés from both El Salvador 
and the Dominican Republic (see Table 2[b]), even though the Cuban diaspora tended to 
be wealthier.44 The Cuban diaspora remains, from a remittance vantage point, dominated 
by the “wrong Cubans”: immigrants without close kin still on the island who sought 
political refuge some thirty to forty years ago. Official U.S. obstacles are only one reason 
why Cubans send relatively less than other nationalities.  
   
Cuban émigrés send less also because of informal pressures by Cuban-American leaders 
to honor a personal embargo of Cuba. In contrast, the Dominican and Salvadoran émigré 
leaders advocate remittance-sending. Reflecting continued Cuban-American resistance to 
income sharing, 74 percent of the Miami based diaspora surveyed in 2000 by Florida 
                                                 
 
43 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data summarize legal immigration. 
The disparity between Cuban and Dominican/Salvadoran immigration rates in the 1990s 
would be greater if immigrants who entered illegally were factored in. The INS estimated  
75,000 Dominicans and 335,000 Salvadorans in 1996 to be undocumented in the U.S.. 
United States Department of Justice (USDJ), INS, Statistical Yearbook of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997 (Washington, D.C.: INS, 1999), p. 200. 
After Cubans touch U.S. soil they qualify for legal residency status in a year and a day, 
even if they entered the country illegally. Cuban-Americans are believed to account for 
89 percent of the island diaspora, with 80 percent of island Cubans acknowledging 
receipt of remittances receiving the transfers from the U.S. (see José Alejandro Aguilar 
Trujillo, “Las remesas desde exterior,” Cuba: Investigación Económico (Havana: 
Instituto Nacional de Investigaciónes  Económicas,  2001), p. 84.  
 
44 See United States Bureau of the Census (USBC), Statistical Abstract of the U.S.  
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics  
and Statistics Administration, 2000), pp. 10, 146. 
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International University reported having close relatives on the island, but only 40 percent 
said they or other Miami relatives sent money. 45 
 
Viewed from the island side of the Florida Straits, Cubans vary in access to income-
sharing cross-border networks. Access, above all, is heavily race-based. The diaspora is  
 
TABLE 3 
 
Immigration into the U.S. in Select Years from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador 
 
 
                                                                  Cuba             Dominican Republic             El Salvador  
 
  (a) annual legal immigration from 
    
             1980                                             15,100                         17,245                            6,101 
             1985                                             20,300                         23,787                          10,156 
             1990                                             10,645                         42,195                          80,173  
             1995                                             17,937                         38,512                          11,744 
             1998                                             17,375                         20,387                          14,590 
 
 (b) total foreign-born population by place of birth 
 
             1980                                            608,000                       169,000                         94.000 
             1990                                            751,000                       357,000                       473,000 
             1999                                            943,000                       679,000                       761,000 
 
(c) U.S. foreign-born Cuban, Dominican, and Salvadoran  
     populations as % of home country population   
 
            1990a                                                 7                                 5                                    9 
             1999                                                  9                                 8                                  13 
 
____________________________ 
 
a: mid-1991 population 
 
 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Statistical Yearbook of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service 1998 (Washington, D.C.: INS, 2000), p. 27; U.S 
Bureau of the Census (USBC), Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984 (Washington, D.C.: 
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration), 
p. 92; 1987, p. 11; 1992, p. 42; and 2000, pp. 10, 48; Population Reference Bureau (PRB), World 
Population Data Sheet of the PRB  (Washington D.C.: PRB, 1991); World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2001, p. 362. 
  
predominantly white. As of the late 1990s 96 percent of all Cuban immigrants in the U.S. 
classified themselves as white.46  Blacks, who in prerevolutionary Cuba were the most 
                                                 
 
45 Florida International University (FIU), Institute for Public Opinion Research (IPOR), 
FIU/Cuba Poll (Miami: FIU-IPOR, 2000), pp. 53, 56.  
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disadvantaged group, benefited most under Castro—relative to their situation under the 
former regime. For this reason they were least likely to emigrate, a loyalty that put them 
at a decided disadvantage in the emergent cross-border based informal dollarized 
economy.47 Access to transnational remittance networks is also heavily urban and 
regional. Havana, with 20 percent of the island’s population, has the highest percentage 
of residents enjoying remittances.48 Approximately 60 percent of remittances go to 
Havana (and mainly to selected neighborhoods there), with remittances accounting for 70 
percent of dollars Cubans informally access. 
 
Data on health welfare point to new inequities that are partly remittance- induced. The 
proportion of the population that is undernourished, with insufficient food intake to meet 
dietary energy requirements, rose from 5 to 17 percent between 1990-91 and the mid-to-
latter 1990s. Although in 1990 Argentina was the only country in the region to have 
fewer malnourished people (0 percent), by the end of the decade only 6 Latin American 
countries had a higher percent undernourished, and no country in the region experienced 
a higher rate of increase than Cuba.49 Malnutrition, which rose while average per capita 
caloric and nutritional intake partially rebounded from the 1993-94 nadir,50 undoubtedly 
follows the dollar/nondollar divide, because rationed food, covering no more than half of 
family monthly needs, is affordable to all. Average peso earnings no longer cover basic 
needs, since items at Farmer Markets instituted in the 1990s (where vendors set prices) 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
46 USBC, Current Population Survey 1997 (March), Table 61: Selected Characteristics of 
the Foreign Born Population by Year of Entry. Washington, D.C. Rarely with kin in the 
diaspora, Blacks were more likely than non-Blacks to make use of Washington’s lottery, 
once introduced in the mid-1990s.  Benigno Aguirre and Eduardo Bonilla Silva, “Does 
Race Matter Among Cuban Immigrants? An Analysis of the Racial Characteristics of 
Recent Cuban Immigrants,” Journal of Latin American Studies vol. 34 part 2 (May 
2002):  311-24.  
 
47 See Alejandro De la Fuente, “Recreating Racism: Race and Discrimination in Cuba’s  
Special Period,” Georgetown University Cuba Briefing Paper Series vol. 18 (1998). 
   
48 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council (UCTEC), “Economic Eye on Cuba” (March  
17, 2002), p. 12; http://www.cubatrade.org. 
 
49 Cubanalysis 39 (2001). Based on the United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization, The State of Food Security in the World 2001. Nineteen of the 20 principal 
Latin American countries are ranked in the study. Haiti, notorious for its poverty, is not 
included. 
 
50 Per capita daily consumption dropped from over 3,000 calories in 1988-1989 to 2,000 
in 1993, but within four years it rebounded to nearly 2,500 (Eckstein, Back from the 
Future, p. 226; ECLAC, p. 261). 
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and at state stores cost 10 to 100 times as much as their price-regulated rationed 
equivalents.51  
 
How inequitable has income distribution become as a result of unequal access to 
remittances (and other dollar sources)?52 Claes Brundenius estimates that the Gini 
coefficient rose from 0.22 to 0.41 between 1986 and 1999, with remittances one of the 
factors contributing to the new inequality.53  
 
The effects of remittance income distribution in Castro’s Cuba differ from those in 
market economies in the region. In the other countries, where income inequality ranks 
among the worst in the world, remittances, channeled to the poorer population, reduce 
earnings differentials. In Cuba, though, where the revolution, through land, wage, and 
welfare reforms dramatically reduced historical inequities, remittances countered this 
trend by widening the income spread. Whereas in the pre-dollarized economy the ratio 
between the highest and lowest salary had been 5 to 1, in the 1990s some Cubans came to 
earn several hundred times more than others.54 Society accordingly is becoming more 
differentiated by income. 
 
Some of the new upper income stratum, comprising high- level joint venture employees 
and the most financially successful participants in the informal (and often illegal) 
economy, as well as the largest remittance recipients, employ gardeners, housekeepers, 
babysitters, and drivers, and they flaunt material wealth. Conspicuous consumption not 
only defies the revolution’s egalitarian precepts but it would have been considered 
socially egregious in the anti-materialist, morally driven early years of Castro’s rule. 
Reportedly, by the start of the new century Cuban awareness of U.S. brand names was 
among the highest for any non-English-speaking country. 55 In contrast, consumerism had 
been so stigmatized during the first decades of the revolution that islanders hid money 
                                                 
 
51 Viviana Togores Gonzalez, “Enfoque social del desempeno de la economia cubana en  
1996,” in La Economía cubana en 1996: Resultados, Problemas y Perspectivas (Havana:  
Universidad de la Habana, Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana, 1997), pp. 96-97. 
 
52 Although remittances are the main source of dollars (cf. Archibald Ritter and Nicholas 
Rowe, “Cuba: From ‘Dollarization’ to ‘Euroization’ or ‘Peso Re-Consideration’?,” Latin 
American Politics and Society [Summer 2002]), Cubans acquire dollars through  
informal tourism, e.g. tips, prostitution, room rentals, and through dollar-charging activity 
that is informal, small-scale, and often illegal (or partially illegal). 
 
53 Claes Brundenius, “Whither the Cuban Economy After Recovery? The Reform  
Process, Upgrading Strategies and the Question of Transition,” Journal of Latin  
American Studies 34 part 2 (May 2002): 365-96. 
 
54 The Economist September 23, 1999, p. 37. 
 
55 New York Times Section 3 May 26, 2002, p. 4. 
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and goods obtained from family in the States.56 Remittances accordingly are also 
corroding the revolution’s culture and value system, restoring mores partia lly reminiscent 
of the prerevolutionary social order.  
 
Conspicuous consumption, in turn, fuels resentments among the peso-dependent 
populace. Labor union and public forums make the resentment apparent.57 Worker 
dissatisfaction, according to one study, rose from 27 to 41 percent between 1989 and 
1999.58  The devaluation of the peso in 2001 undoubtedly intensified such dissatisfaction. 
 
Reliance on remittances, meanwhile, makes Cubans more directly and personally 
vulnerable to the very market vicissitudes the revolution had sought to eliminate. 
Whereas prior to the revolution economic opportunities varied, above all, with the effect 
world sugar prices had on the macro economy, islander income in the new economy has 
become subject, in no small part, to the impact global market conditions have on family 
abroad. As the U.S. experienced a recession that deepened after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, overseas relatives sent fewer dollars.59 New immigrants, in particular, 
are typically employed in jobs most vulnerable to business cycle vicissitudes. 
 
Cubans with dollar access have yet, however, to solidify into a new privileged social 
class. First, for many Cubans dollar access is erratic. While some 62 percent of the 
population were estimated to have dollar access in 2002, only around 27 to 35 percent 
were believed to have continual access.60 Second, Cubans differ in the amount as well as 
regularity of remittances received. The dollar stratum accordingly is itself internally 
divided. Third, at the time of writing, the government still managed to contain dollar-
based capital accumulation, through, for example, heavy taxation of private economic 
ventures. Fourth, remittance access did not reinforce political privilege. Families of Party 
members, loyal to the revolution, were less apt to emigrate than the population politically 
indifferent. Without overseas networks to tap into, those in this political cadre were at a 
disadvantage in the new economy.  
 
Meanwhile, the new consumer culture that eroded revolutionary precepts and values has 
fomented rent-seeking, corruption, and theft among islanders otherwise without dollars. 
The peso-dependent populace turned to such illicit and immoral activity so as to 
participate in the dollar economy. Islanders pilfer, pirate, and illegally appropriate 
supplies from state jobs to sell on the black market, and they bribe authorities to gain 
                                                 
 
56 Eckstein, “Globalized Family Based Social Capital,” unpublished paper, 2002. 
 
57 EIU, CCR (November 2000), p. 18. 
 
58 EIU, CCR (February 2001), p. 11. 
 
59 Florida Sun-Sentinel October 28, 2001. 
  
60 UCTEC (U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council)(March 17, 2002), p. 12.   
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access to jobs offering such opportunities.61 Pervasive economic crime and corruption 
provoked the Communist Party and the state-controlled media to campaign against them 
and “social indiscipline.” In 2001 the government created a Ministry of Audit and 
Control to strengthen economic monitoring, and it tried to reinvigorate the largely 
defunct CDRs (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, state- linked block 
organizations) to mobilize against crime, delinquency, and indiscipline.62 
 
B. Impact on the State 
 
From the state’s vantage point, remittances have had contradictory effects. Officially 
channeled remittances provided much needed revenue to finance imports, economic 
development, and foreign loan repayments. However, the income transfers have failed to 
offset Cuba’s difficulties in attracting bilateral and multilateral aid, direct investment, and 
hard currency generating exports. Even with the infusion of “migra-dollars, Cuba 
imported less in 1999 than in 1990, a decade during which imports to the Dominican 
Republic and El Salvador nearly tripled.63 And Cuba’s foreign debt in 2000 stood 2 and 4 
times greater than that of the Dominican Republic and El Salvador respectively. 
 
Remittance- linked dollarization of the economy in certain respects has helped the state 
politically as well. Although stirring resentments among the peso-dependent populace, 
the stepped-up dollar-based consumption has defused survival- linked political pressures.   
         
The transnationally based informal dollarization, however, at has generated problems for 
the state. The government officially has maintained a monopoly on the vending of most 
nondurables and all but fresh fruits, vegetables, and meats, but in so doing has 
unintentionally contributed to black marketeering. Vendors who have offered items to 
dollar-holders at below official agency prices have created a market for their products. 
 
Remittances, furthermore, have fueled a black market in housing that has undermined 
state control over allocations of dwelling units and building supplies. Illustrative of this 
problem, in 2000 the government confiscated more than 2,000 illicitly obtained homes in 
the capital and imposed fines amounting to more than $1 million. 64 Furthermore, 
although authorities targeted building supplies for the state tourist sector which has 
                                                 
 
61 While scarcities alone might induce pilfering and the like, the new dollar-based 
consumer culture made islanders covet more material goods at a time when peso earnings 
bought less.  
 
62 EIU, CCR (August 2001), p. 13. 
 
63 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001),  
p. 214. 
 
64 EIU, CCR (May 2001), p. 19. 
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brought in hard currency, islanders with dollars have illegally purchased much needed 
and wanted home improvement supplies, involving goods largely stolen from state jobs. 
        
The informal dollarization has also adversely affected state sector peso-based 
productivity. The peso economy has remained the main source of employment and the 
base both for the cradle-to-grave welfare state, on which regime legitimacy has rested, 
and for production of most foreign exchange generating exports. But in the new 
dollarized economy islanders have calculated peso earnings in their hard currency 
equivalency. Since few state jobs have paid more than the equivalent of  $10-20 a month, 
far less than average remittance earnings secured without any work effort whatsoever, 
incentive has eroded to labor at most peso-paying jobs, which had paid the social wage. 
Peso-paid workers have absented themselves from their state jobs with frequency, partly 
to pursue dollar-earning sideline activities in the underground economy. Labor 
motivation was highest in those peso-paying state jobs that provide access either to 
dollars (informally, if not formally) or to goods that can be pilfered for black 
marketeering. 
 
Disillusioned peso-dependent skilled state workers have fomented a domestic, and not 
merely overseas, brain drain. Because the government has wished to ensure the free 
delivery of public social services central to its legitimacy, it has prevented professionals 
from engaging in private activity. The restrictions, however, have generated unintended 
consequences. Professionals instead have left their state jobs for low-skilled work which 
provides informal access to dollars, e.g. in tourism. Some university-educated women 
have turned to dollar-earning prostitution in the tourist sector.  
 
With peso jobs unattractive and restrictions imposed on work options for university 
graduates, the younger generation has showed declining interest in higher education. One 
of Latin America’s most educated populations “deschooled” as well as “deskilled.”65 The 
proportion of the school-aged population enrolled in post-secondary studies dropped from 
17 percent in 1980 to 12 percent in 1997. During these years the percentage enrolled in 
higher education rose from 18 to 23 in the Dominican Republic and from 9 to 18 in El 
Salvador.66  
                                                 
65 Government restrictions on graduates led students to acquire training, such as in 
computer skills, but quit before graduation.  
 
66 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: World Bank 2001), p. 
86; www.worldbank.org/education/pdf/tertiary.  A shift in state education policy also 
contributed to the deschooling. In 1991, when the crisis first set in, authorities tried to 
retrack the school-aged population from university to technical studies. See Granma 
International May 26, 1991, p. 8. Here too the government met with resistance, as 
families did not happily accept children’s lowered status implicit in the retracking. But 
with the university drop-off rate higher than the government intended, and with students 
resisting rechanneling to more technical and vocational education, Castro directly 
appealed to youth to reintegrate into higher education at the turn of the century through a 
massive expansion of social work/social inquiry studies. 
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To minimize losses in productivity and labor in the new economy, the revenue-poor 
government initiated some costly worker- incentive reforms. The most economically and 
socially valued state enterprises began to feed, clothe, and house their workers,67 to offer 
performance bonuses, and to pay employees a portion of their salary in hard currency, 
especially in a new so-called convertible currency with dollar value, but only in Cuba. 
The government also raised base-pay peso earnings. In 1999, for example, the 
government announced salary increases of 30 percent for teachers, doctors, and police.68 
Two years later 40 percent of the labor force received hard currency or convertible 
currency bonuses, up from 30 percent in 1997. Bonuses amounted to 1 to 7 times the 
monthly base peso wage,69 costing the state $228 million in scarce hard currency, 70 the 
equivalent of one-fourth to one-third of the estimated total remittance intake at the time 
(and a higher percentage, according to the most conservative remittance estimates). The 
added peso and hard currency outlays, which have left the government reduced funds for 
investment, have been spill-over costs in the state economy that governments in market 
economies need not absorb. Remittances have indirectly contributed to the pressure for 
the fiscal concessions, although they have not been the only force at play.  
 
In monopolizing most permitted retail trade, the government, in addition, has assumed 
more responsibility for consumer spending, including that in hard currency, than 
governments in market economies. By 2000 consumer goods accounted for one-fourth of 
the government’s slimmed-down import bill.71 While domestic light industrial output by 
then had rebounded to the point that half the value of sales in dollar shops was locally 
produced, industry drew on substantially more hard currency financing than any other 
sector.72 To make matters worse, the state’s official near-monopoly on retail trade has 
had the unintended effect of stimulating black market commerce to the extent that it too 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
67 Workers received debit cards usable only at designated stores. In this manner the 
government addressed consumer demand while minimizing the circulation of money that 
could fuel the black market. 
 
68 Earlier in the 1990s authorities raised salaries of employees in activity generating hard 
currency for the state. 
 
69 UCTEC (March 17, 2002), p. 12.  
 
70 See The Economist October 23, 1999, p. 37; EIU, CCR February 2001, p. 19 and 
August  
2001, p. 22; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, p. 48. 
 
71 EIU, CCR  November 2001, p. 5. 
 
72 Banco Central de Cuba, Informe Economico 2000 (Havana: Banco Central, 2000), p.  
33.   
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has absorbed a higher portion of consumer spending than in market economies, where 
most transactions transpire through legal private businesses. 
 
Government efforts to channel towards savings the informal dollarization not absorbed 
through consumption, moreover, has proved only partially effective. Dollar bank 
accounts have absorbed few of the informal dollars islanders possessed, although their 
use has gradually increased.73 Most Cubans have preferred to hoard dollars they did not 
use for immediate consumption. They have feared possible government appropriation of 
their deposits, a fear with some historical base. Castro, upon taking power, froze bank 
accounts and confiscated other assets, such as land. Cubans have also preferred that 
authorities not know their dollar holdings, often obtained in ways not fully compliant 
with the law. Furthermore, low interest rates (of  0.5 percent annually for depositors of 
more than $200)  have provided people with little incentive to bank money. 74  
         
 
The taxes initiated both to raise revenue for the cash-strapped state and to reduce 
dollar/non-dollar holder income disparities have also met with dollar-holder resistance. 
When the government, for example, introduced license fees, private activity went 
underground. The number of officially registered self-employed islanders, some utilizing 
remittances for their operations, dropped 23 percent between the mid-1990s and the 
decade’s end, after levies were introduced.75 And, in 2000 personal income taxes 
accounted for a mere 3 percent of total tax revenue.76 From the moment the government 
announced direct taxa tion, which was without precedent in Castro’s Cuba, the 
government has encountered resistance.77 
                                  
                                                 
 
73 EIU, CCR August 2001, p. 20 and CCR June 2000, p. 19. 
 
74 Ritter and Rowe 2002. 
 
75 EIU, CCR May 2001, p. 18. Of the 162,000 islanders registered to pay income tax, 89 
percent paid in domestic currency, 11 percent in hard currency (EIU, CCR May 2000, p. 
17). No doubt, the government had greater difficulty collecting taxes in hard currency, 
both because islanders valued their dollars more and accordingly concealed their full 
dollar earnings, and because the government had more information about peso-acquired 
earnings, making evasion of peso taxes more difficult.  
 
76 EIU CCR August 2001, p. 18. 
 
77 Eckstein, “The Limits of Socialism in a Capitalist World Economy,” pp. 142-47.   
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V. Conclusion 
      
When compared with the experiences of countries having economies of roughly similar 
size but different polities, different dominant patterns of economic ownership, and  
different global constraints, the experience of Cuba in the post-Soviet era suggests 
several propositions about conditions conducive to remittances. Cuba’s experience, in 
comparative perspective, also suggests propositions about the range of effects remittances 
may have and why, on both states and society. 
         
First, the analysis suggests that the unequal opportunities in the global economy that have 
spurred Third World immigration since the late twentieth century have raised living 
standards not merely of those who leave but of family left behind. Third World peoples 
have become their own capital fund-raisers, through the development and cultivation of 
transnational kinship ties. Their success at eliciting remittances depends, however, not 
merely on the wealth (and the presumed disposable income) of overseas family or even 
on how recently relatives emigrated. It is also contingent on how politically predisposed 
overseas kin are toward sharing their earnings, and on institutional mediating factors at 
the transnational/bilateral, national, and community levels. 
 
Second, the Cuban experience suggests that whether Third World peoples secure 
remittances depends more on their needs and wants and their transnational networks than 
on state policy and the law. Official regulations shape mainly how remittances are 
transmitted: whether legally and overtly, or illegally and covertly. Remittance-senders 
and recipients who evade official rules and regulations do so because regimes prioritize 
state interests over constituents’ interests.  
 
Third, the stances of both society and state toward remittances must be understood in the 
context of alternative revenue sources. In the absence of sufficient aid, investment, and 
trade, remittances may become essential not merely for peoples’ survival but also for a 
state’s ability to address its own institutional concerns.  
         
Fourth, remittances are not necessarily equally or simultaneously beneficial to state and 
society. While recipients can use money from family abroad to raise their material living 
standards and sometimes also to invest in housing and to finance capital-accumulating 
ventures, the state’s institutional interests are best served by maximizing the hard 
currency it appropriates, through exchange rate regulations, taxation, control over 
consumption, and the like. Even from the state vantage point remittances may generate 
contradictory dynamics, as authorities balance long term with short term, investment with 
consumption, and economic goals with political goals.  
 
Fifth, remittances may generate consequences that senders and recipients, as well as 
authorities, may not intend, foresee, or favor. Because the effects of remittances are  
shaped by structures in which the foreign currency becomes embedded, their results 
differ in market and in socialist economies. In the Cuban socialist economy, informally 
circulating dollars also tend to undermine regime priorities, plans, and power, including  
control over cradle-to-grave welfare as well as income and consumer equality. Informally 
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circulating dollars are likely to create indirect labor market distortions that undermine 
productivity and erode regime legitimacy. To offset the distortions Cuba’s socialist 
government incurs costs that governments in market economies do not. 
 
Difficulties Cuban authorities encounter in regulating remittances reveal a regime 
economically weaker than models of strong states/weak societies under Communism 
suggest. Moreover, the weakness results from informal social, cultural, political, and 
economic dynamics that are transnationally, not nationally rooted. At the same time, the 
Cuban experience reveals that society is not uniformly able to assert itself, because of 
differential access to transnational dollar-generating networks. Those Cubans whose 
families were transnationalized in the post-Soviet era and whose relatives emigrated for 
economic reasons are best positioned to receive remittances. Cuba has become more 
socially differentiated, not more homogenized as other Soviet bloc countries became at 
the eve of the collapse of their Communist regimes.   
 
In sum, in the context of a socialist political economy, remittances may serve to erode a 
society’s social and cultural fabric and plant seeds of economic transformation, quite 
independently of the reasons people turned to overseas kin for assistance. They may have 
such system-erosive effects while generating regime-bolstering hard currency revenue. 
The informal transnational dollar flows, with all the contradictory tendencies they set in 
motion, at the time of writing, nonetheless, left Cuba’s formal polity intact. Whatever the 
long-term political effects of remittances, by the start of the new century they had  
transformed  socialism as historically constructed in Cuba.78 
 
        
                                                 
78 Although analysis of political structures and ideology are beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is noteworthy that Cuban authorities shifted emphasis from Marxist-Leninism to 
nationalism in the 1990s. The shift reflects the regime’s effort to redefine its base of 
legit imation at a time when Soviet bloc Communism was internationally discredited and 
when Party and ideological loyalty left basic needs unaddressed. 
